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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
A recen t w r ite r  in  th e  H ibbert Journal remarks th a t  th e  
ex isten ce  of God remains so f a r  unproved th a t  i t  can yet be denied; 
th a t  mankind i s  s t i l l  and may ever be d ivided in to  th e  sec tio n  
th a t  b e liev es  and th e  sec tio n  th a t  den ies; and th a t  w hile to  some 
the  proofs fo r  God's ex istence a re  adequate, yet' to  o th e rs  th e re  i s  
d is - s a t i s f a e t io n  w ith  th e  arguments p resen ted  in  favour o f th e  th e ­
sis*  The w r ite r  continues}
"This s ta te  of th in g s  i s  so wholly t e r r i f i c  to  th e  b e l ie ­
v er t h a t f once more, he s e ts  fo r th  on th e  sacred q u est; 
th e  journey in  search of th e  Holy G ra il;  th e  philosoph­
e r 's  stone th a t  w i l l  transm ute h is  p ro p o sitio n s  in to  demon­
s tra tio n s*
"He w i l l  f a i l  once more, even though he achieve something, 
fo r  i t  i s  a q u es tio n , not of p ro o f, but of d iscovery . God 
has to  be found, not proved.” (Hibbert Jo u rn a l, Vol.XXIV,402)»
The a r t i c le  in  question  i s  ju s t  one more in d ic a tio n  of 
th e  peren n ia l in te r e s t  in  th e  problem of God. D iscussions o f i t  
sooner o r l a t e r  reach th e  pages o f every jo u rn a l devoted to  P h ilos­
ophy. Mankind i s  ever attem pting to  fin d  c e r titu d e  upon th e  ques­
t io n .  I  f e e l ,  th e n , th a t  a  review of th e  arguments fo r  and ag a in st
th e  ex isten ce  of God, to g e th e r  w ith  an attem pt to  evaluate  some of 
them, w i l l  c o n s titu te  a  f r u i t f u l  ex erc ise  fo r  anyone co n s tan tly  in  
con tact w ith  people whose th in k in g  tu rn s  to  philosophy and kindred 
su b je c ts .
The Problem in  Ancient Times
Although Xenophanes was th e  f i r s t  known th in k e r  to  ra is e  
th e  conception of God to  a philosophic plane in  c o n tra d is tin c tio n  
to  p o ly th e is t ic  anthropomorphism, and, according to  A r is to t le ,  gawe
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2th e  f i r e t  a  p r io r i  proof of th e  u n ity  of God, yet i t  remained fo r 
Anaxagoras (c irc a  500 B .C .| to  in troduce th e  concept of I n t e l l i ­
gence as being th e  source of a l l  th ings*  Reasoning from th e  ap­
p aren t d esign , o rd e r, beau ty , and harmony of th e  u n iv e rse , he pos­
tu la te d  a  w o rld -eo n tro llin g  Nous ( in te llig e n c e )  as an a l te rn a t iv e  
to  b lin d  chance or ehaos* Although b lin d  fo rces a c tin g  upon cha­
os would produce motion and change, th e  r e s u l t  would be merely 
m eaningless and purposeless motion and changej i t  i s  in te l l ig e n c e  
only th a t  could bring  about law and order* The follow ing fragments 
from h is  works in d ic a te  h is  th eo ry :
nIn  th e  beginning th e re  was an in f in i t e  number of th in g s , 
a l l  mixed up to g e th e r , th en  mind came and separated  them 
and arranged them a l l  in  d is t in c t  o rder."(D .L . 11, 6 ) .
“Mind i s  independent; i t  i s  not mixed w ith anything e ls e ,  
i s  e n t ire  in  i t s e l f .  Mind i s  th e  most su b tle  and th e  
p u rest of th in g s ."  (Frag. 8 ) .
" I t  has a  supreme power over a l l  th in g s ."
"Mind possesses unlim ited  know ledge*"(Sim plicius, 271 a , 30).
The Nous, th e re fo re , according to  Anaxagoras, possesses 
th e  follow ing n o tes : ( l )  I t  i s  th e  cause of motion in  th e  un i­
verse (2) I t  stands by i t s e l f ,  unmixed w ith anything e ls e ,  e x is ts  
ap a rt from m a tte r , and i s  simple* (3) I t  does not c re a te  m a tte r , 
but arranges i t .  (4) I t  possesses a l l  knowledge*
In  viewing the  Nous as a  d esig n er, Anaxagoras may be sa id  
to  have been th e  o r ig in a to r  of th e  te le o le g ie a l  argument* I t  cannot 
be sa id  th a t  he did  much more than  to  in troduce a new theory  in to  
philosophy. He did not prove much i f  anyth ing , but he did make a  
r e a l  attem pt to  exp lain  the  r id d le  of the  w orld. He leaves p h ilo s -
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©phy w ith  a  dualism of mind and m a tte r , both of which e x is t  side  
by side  from a l l  e te r n i ty .  A r is to t le  has noted th a t  Anaxagoras 
used th e  theory  of th e  Nous whenever he was a t a lo s s  to  exp lain  
why anything n ecessa rily  i s ,  and th a t  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of th e  
Nous i s  merely adding another term to  th e  mechanism of th e  un i­
v e rse .
With Socrates th e re  came in to  philosophy th e  f i r s t  re ­
a l ly  tru e  conception of a  Divine P e rso n a lity ; and he a lso  in ­
troduced th e  proof by f in a l  causes fo r  th e  ex istence  of God. He 
conceived th e  universe as th e  product of a  moral cause; and ac­
knowledged not only the  ex istence of God but a lso  of Providence. 
S ocrates was th e re fo re  th e  f i r s t  to  make known to  philosophy th e  
moral God- th e  present day conception of God as held by th e  f o l l ­
owers of C h r is t ia n ity .
P lato  gave a f u l l e r  development and a  more s c ie n t i f ic  
form to  th e  conceptions of S o cra tes . The Id ea , according to  P la to , 
i s  th e  u n iv e rsa l and e s s e n tia l  element in  a l l  th in g s , th a t  which 
i s  fixed  and permanent in  them. The Idea i s  su p erio r to  in d iv id u ­
a l s ,  not only in  q u an tity  as being th e  one in  th e  many, but a lso  in  
q u a li ty .  Amongst a l l  th e  d if fe re n t  Id ea s , he g ives th e  h ighest 
rank to  th e  Ideas of what i s  most p e r fe c t-  th e  J u s t ,  th e  F a ir ,  the  
Good.
" ...T h e re  i s  an abso lu te  beauty and goodness, an abso lu te  
essence of a l l  th in g s . . .F o r  th e re  i s  nothing which, to  my 
mind, i s  so pa ten t as th a t  beauty , goodness.. .have a most 
r e a l  and abso lu te  ex is te n c e ."  (Phaedo 77).
A ll th ese  Id eas , or bases of v is ib le  and sen sib le  r e a l i ty ,  
have th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of e x is ten c e , but they  depend upon a  h igher
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Id ea , God, from which they cannot be sep ara ted . A ll th ese  Id eas , 
th e re fo re ,  have th e i r  substance in  th e  Idea of th e  Good, which i s  
God Himself *
"In  th e  world of knowledge the  Idea of Good appears l a s t  
of a l l ,  and i s  seen only w ith  an e f f o r t ;  and when seen i s  
a lso  re fe rre d  to  th e  u n iv e rsa l au thor of a l l  th in g s  b e a u ti­
fu l  and r ig h t ,  parent of l ig h t  and of th e  lo rd  of l ig h t  in  
t h i s  v is ib le  w orld, and th e  immediate source of reason and 
t r u th  in  th e  in te l l e c tu a l ."  (Republic 711, 517 a ) .
P lato  endeavours to  e s ta b lis h  God’s ex istence by means of 
argum ents, and th e re fo re  th e  f i r s t  so -ca lled  proofs fo r  th e  e x is t ­
ence of God r e a l ly  o r ig in a te  w ith him. These proofs a re  four in  
numbers
(1) The proof by e f f ic ie n t  cause. P la to  p o s tu la te s  a
cause fo r  everything th a t  comes in to  being . His conclusion i s
th a t  th e re  e x is ts  a power capable of causing th in g s  to  change.
(2) What i s  in  th e  e f fe c t  e x is ts  id e a lly  in  th e  cause.
The w orld-soul i s  th e  cause of th e  u n iv e rse , but the  w orld-soul i s  
c rea ted  by God:
" . . .a n d  in  th e  d iv ine nature of Zeus would you not say 
th a t  th e re  i s  the soul and the mind of a k ing , because th e re  
i s  in  him th e  power of th e  cause?" (P h il.  30).
(3) The proof from m otion.
"There are  two kinds of m otion; th e re  i s  a motion ab le  to  
move o ther th in g s , but not to  move i t s e l f ,  and th e re  i s  a 
motion th a t  can move i t s e l f  as w ell as o ther th in g s . The 
substance th a t  can move i t s e l f  i s ,  th e re fo re , th e  cause of 
motion in  substances th a t  cannot move them selves. The soul 
i s ,  th en , p r io r  to  th e  body, and, consequently , i t s  charac­
t e r ,  and manners, and w ishes, and reason ings, and tru e  opin­
io n s , and r e f le c t io n s ,  and re c o lle c tio n s  are  p r io r  to  len g th , 
and b read th , and s tren g th  of bod ies. I f ,  my f r ie n d , we say 
th a t  th e  whole path and movement of heaven, and of a l l  th a t  
-  i s  th e re in ,  i s  by nature akin  to  the  movement, and revo lu ­
t io n ,  and c a lc u la tio n  of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws,
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th e n , as i s  p la in ,  we must say th a t  th e  b est soul tak es 
care of th e  w orld, and guides i t  along th e  good p a th .”
(Laws X)•
(4) The proof by f in a l  causes. This d o c trin e  was held  
by Socrates as w ell as P la to , and was taught by them in  c o n tra s t 
to  th e  explanation  of th e  universe by purely physica l causes.
In  te l l ig e n c e  i s  demanded by th ese  two philosophers as th e  f in a l  
cause of th e  u n iv erse . Thus i t  i s  th a t  P la to ’s system i s  te le o -  
lo g ic a l .
In  P la to 's  system, one Idea may p reside  over sev era l 
o ther ideas u n t i l  th e  f in a l  Idea , the  Good, i s  reached, which p re­
sides over a l l  o th er Id eas . The question  now a r is e s  as to  wheth­
e r  th e  Idea of the  Good i s  id e n tic a l  w ith God. Z e lle r  says th a t  
i f  God i s  separate  from the  h ighest id e a , only th re e  r e la t io n s  are 
p o s s ib le , a l l  of which a rs  equally  o b jec tio n ab le . The only a l t e r ­
n a tiv e , th e re fo re , i s  th a t  God i s  id e n tic a l  w ith th e  Idea of th e  
Good. But since th e  Idea i s  not a person, God th e re fo re  cannot 
be p e rso n a l. Stace concludes th a t  where P lato  speaks of God, he 
i s  to  be thought of as speaking in  a m ythical manner as he o ften  
d id .
Stace summs up P la to 's  philosophy in  th e  follow ing words*
"P lato  i s  th e  g rea t founder of id ea lism , th e  i n i t i a t o r  of 
a l l  subsequent t ru th s  in  philosophy. But as always w ith 
p io n eers , h is  idealism  i s  crude. I t  cannot exp la in  the  
w orld; i t  cannot exp la in  i t s e l f .  I t  cannot even keep tru e  
to  i t s  own p r in c ip le s ,  because, having fo r  th e  f i r s t  time in  
h is to ry  d e f in ite ly  enunciated the  t ru th  th a t  r e a l i ty  i s  the  
u n iv e rsa l, i t  straightway fo rg e ts  i t s  own creed and plunges 
back in to  a p a rtic u la rism  which regards the Ideas as e x is t ­
ent in d iv id u a ls . I t  was th ese  defec ts  which A r is to t le  se t 
him self to  r e c t i fy  in  a purer idealism  , shorn of P la to 's  
im p u ritie s ."  (S tace- C r i t ic a l  H is t, of Greek P h il .  247).
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I t  i s  to  A r is to t le  th a t  we owe th e  f i r s t  complete and s c i ­
e n t i f i c  proof of the  ex istence of God. This i s  known as th e  Proof
of the  F i r s t  Mover. The proof i s  summed up as fo llow s;
"Everything th a t  i s  in  motion i s  moved, e i th e r  by some­
th in g  e ls e ,  or by i t s e l f .  Let us suppose the  former to  be 
th e  case . Given th ese  th re e  term s; the  th in g  th a t  i s  
moved, the  mover, and th e  medium by which th e  mover moves 
th e  th in g  moved. The medium i s  a mover, since i t  s e ts  the 
th in g  moved in  motion; but i t  i s  a lso  a moveable body, 
since  i t  only communicates motion; th e re fo re , th e  medium 
i s  only a  middle term . Now between th e  moveable body and 
th e  mover, th e re  cannot be an in f in i te  number of middle 
t e m s ,  fo r th e  s e r ie s  of causes cannot be i n f i n i t e ;  th e re ­
fo re  by follow ing the  s e r ie s  of media we must a r r iv e  a t  a 
term which i s  not moved by any o th e r . The f i r s t  charac­
t e r i s t i c  of th e  f i r s t  mover i s ,  th e re fo re , th a t  i t  i s  im­
moveable, a t le a s t  with regard to  anything e lse  but i t s e l f .  
I f ,  th e re fo re , th e  f i r s t  mover were in  m otion, i t  could 
only be s e t in  motion by i t s e l f .  But a th in g  th a t  moves 
i t s e l f  cannot do so e n t i r e ly ,  in  the  same in s ta n t ,  and in  
th e  same manner, fo r  motion i s  given and received  in  th e  
same in d iv is ib le  poin t of tim e . I f ,  th e re fo re , a th in g  
moved i t s e l f  e n t i r e ly ,  one th in g  would be g iv ing  and re ­
ce iv in g , ac tin g  and su ffe rin g  th e  same th in g  a t  th e  same 
tim e , and th e re  would be two c o n tra d ic to rie s  e x is tin g  a t 
one time and a t th e  same ideas in s ta n t .  The th ing  moved i s  
in  a s ta te  of p o te n t ia l i ty ;  th e  mover i s  a c tu a l and cannot 
th e re fo re  be a t th e  same moment and in  th e  same sense both 
p o te n tia l  and a c tu a l .  Thus, a th in g  th a t  moves i t s e l f  
must co n sis t of something th a t  moves and something th a t  i s .  
moved, and each of th ese  two elements cannot be a t  one time 
th e  th ing  moved and a t  another tim e th e  th in g  th a t  moves the  
o th e r , fo r  th i s  would be a c i r c l e .  T herefore , th e  mover 
as mover must i t s e l f  n ec e ssa rily  be immovable. Consequent­
ly  th e re  are  th re e  kinds of movers: f i r s t l y  the  mover th a t
im parts motion and i s  moved (n a tu ra l th in g s ) ;  secondly 
th e  mover th a t  i s  moveable in  i t s e l f ,  but immoveable w ith 
regard  to  the  r e s t ( th e  fix ed  s t a r ,  th e  f i r s t  heaven); l a s t ­
ly ,  th e  mover th a t  i s  immoveable, both w ith regard to  i t ­
s e l f ,  and w ith  regard to  o th e r th in g s , and th i s  i s  God.
The ab so lu te ly  immoveable mover only moves th in g s  by the  in ­
term ediary  of th e  r e la t iv e ly  immoveable mover, th e  f i r s t  hea­
ven, and th i s  i t  i s  th a t  moves th e  r e s t  of th e  w orld."
(Ravaisson, E ssai sur l a  Metaph. 1 , 459).
To say th a t  th e  above proof fo r  God’s ex istence  i s  merely 
adding another term to  th e  mechanism of th e  world as Anaxagoras d id , 
would in d ic a te  a  m isunderstanding of the  meaning of t ru e  e f f ic ie n t
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
cause in  A r i s to t l e 's  philosophy. The tru e  e f f ic ie n t  cause i s  the  
f in a l  cause. With A r is to t le ,  God i s  not a  f i r s t  mechanical cause 
which ex is ted  before th e  world in  tim e and crea ted  i t ,  but i s  a  t e l -  
eo lo g ica l cause working from th e  end. God's r e la t io n  to  th e  world 
i s  not one of tim e , nor of cause and e f f e c t ,  but a  lo g ic a l one. He 
i s  lo g ic a lly  p r io r  to  a l l  beginning , and as f in a l  cause i s  th e  ab­
so lu te  end, th a t  to  which a l l  th in g s  move.
For A r is to t le ,  God alone i s  ab so lu te ly  ac tu a l and r e a l .
In  th e  sca le  of being , God i s  th e  ab so lu te ly  r e a l ,  and o th er beings 
are  more or le s s  u n re a l. As formal cause He i s  e s s e n tia l ly  thought 
o r reason . As f in a l  cause He i s  th e  abso lu te  end, and as e f f i c ­
ie n t  cause He i s  th e  f i r s t  mover. This argument comes up con tin ­
u a lly  in  th e  H istory of Philosophy, and we s h a ll  meet i t  again  in  
t h i s  paper.
I s  th e  God of A r is to tle  personal? A r is to t le  him self 
did not th in k  of d iscussing  the  q u es tio n . I t  was not d iscussed  
a t a l l  amongst th e  Greek p h ilo sophers, but i t  i s  a  question  of our 
own day. Stace defines p e rso n a lity  as implying an in d iv id u a l and 
e x is te n t consciousness, and concludes th a t  A r is to t le ’ s God cannot 
be personal because God being abso lu te  form, and form being th e  u- 
n iv e rs a l ,  God cannot be in d iv id u a l; and since form w ithout m atter 
cannot e x i s t ,  and as God i s  form w ithout m a tte r , He cannot be re ­
garded as e x is te n t ,  though He i s  ab so lu te ly  r e a l .  Since God i s  
n e ith e r  e x is te n t nor in d iv id u a l, He i s  th e re fo re  not a  person .
"But the  o ther hy p o th esis , th a t  God i s  a person , means 
th a t  A r is to tle  committed a  c o n tra d ic tio n , not merely in  
words, but in  though t, and not merely as regards some un-
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im portant d e ta il*  but as regards the  c e n tra l th e s is  of h is  
system. I t  seems th a t  he s tu l t i f i e d  him self by making h 
h is  conception of God ab so lu te ly  c o n trad ic t th e  e s se n tia ls  
of h is  system. For what i s  th e  whole of A r i s to t l e ’ s p h i l ­
osophy* put in  a n u tsh e ll?  I t  i s  th a t  th e  A bsolute i s  
th e  u n iv e rsa l, but th a t  th e  u n iv ersa l does not e x is t  apart 
from th e  p a r t ic u la r .  . . .  To a s se r t  th a t  God, th e  abso lu te  
form, e x is ts  as an in d iv id u a l, i s  f l a t l y  to  co n tra d ic t 
t h i s .  I t  i s  not l ik e ly  th a t  A r is to tle  should have co n tra ­
d ic ted  him self in  so v i t a l  a m a tte r, and in  such a  manner 
which simply means th a t  h is  system f a l l s  to  th e  ground lik e  
a house of cards.
My conclusion , th e n , i s  th a t  i t  was not A r i s to t l e 's  in ­
te n tio n  th a t  what he c a l ls  God should be regarded as a per­
son. God i s  thought, but not su b jec tiv e  though t. He i s  
not thought e x is te n t in  a mind, but o b jec tiv e  though t, re ­
a l  on i t s  own account, ap a rt from any mind which th in k s  i t ,  
l ik e  P la to 's  Id e a s . But P la to 's  m istake was to  suppose 
th a t  because thought i s  r e a l  and o b je c tiv e , i t  must e x is t .  
A r is t to t le  avoids t h i s  e r ro r .  The abso lu te  thought i s  
th e  ab so lu te ly  r e a l .  But i t  does not e x is t ."
(S tace- C r i t ic a l  H is t ,  of Greek P h il .  288).
At f i r s t  s ig h t ,  the  arguments p resented  above may seem 
very s tran g e ; but th e re  i s  a very good explanation  given when the
author s ta te s  th a t  God i s  not thought e x is te n t in  a  mind, but ob­
je c tiv e  though t, r e a l  on i t s  own account, ap art from any mind which 
th in k s  i t .  The S ch o lastics  reserved  th e  term  " su b s is ts "  in s tead  
of th e  word "e x is ts "  fo r use when speaking p h ilo so p h ica lly  of God. 
The Absolute i s  so f a r  above th e  comprehension of th e  mind th a t  a 
sp ec ia l term o ther than  ex istence i s  needed to  speak of i t .  The 
follow ing quotation  expresses th e  same opinions
" In  re fe r r in g  to  Him as to  a person we must modify our 
usual id ea  of a p a r t ic u la r  body in  tim e and p lac e . Indeed
we have to  omit body, se n sa tio n s , movement, i n s t in c t s ,  emo­
t io n s ,  v o l i t io n .  The F in a l Reason, in  whom a l l  th in g s  
have purpose, th e  p e rfec t goal of evo lu tion  a t t r a c t in g  the  
universe by love unto Himself has no need of our views or 
adv ice . Worship would, indeed, seem to  be n a tu ra l ,  since 
not only men but th e  whole of n a tu re , a l l  p la n ts  and th e  
very s ta r s ,  a re  spontaneously drawn toward His ex ce llen ce ."
(Warbeke- The Searching Mind of Greece, 305).
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The follow ing quo ta tion  shows th e  th in k in g  of th e  New Re­
a l i s t s  in  regard to  th e  concepts of subsistence and ex is ten ce :
"We are  brought to  th e  sudden re a l iz a t io n  th a t  th e re  are 
many th in g s  in  th e  world besides physica l and m ental 
th ings*  Physical and m ental th in g s , events and p ro cesses, 
are  r e a l  in  t h i s  r e a l i s t i c  p lu r a l i s t i c  system, but so a lso  
are  p r in c ip le s  of reason , lo g ic a l  p r in c ip le s ,  in te rn a l  and 
ex te rn a l r e la t io n s ,  numbers, space, tim e , s e r ie s ,  and such 
id e a l e n t i t i e s  as ju s t ic e  and beauty . These l a t t e r  non­
p hysica l and non-mental e n t i t i e s  we may, i f  we choose, c a l l  
s u b s is te a ts , i f  we wish to  lim it  th e  term  e x is te n t th in g  
to  such as are conditioned by space and tim e ."
(P a trick - In tro d u c tio n  to  Philosophy, 259).
I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to  see th a t  th e  A bsolute, being th e  
only r e a l i ty  in  th e  sense of being ab so lu te ly  independent upon any­
th in g  e ls e ,  cannot be conditioned by space and tim e , and th a t  i t  
i s  not exactly  co rrec t to  speak of i t  as having ex istence  which i s  
a beingfe cond ition  w ith respect to  time and space. We s h a ll  meet 
th e  problem of a personal God again  in  t h i s  th e s i s .
The Problem in  Mediaeval Times
S t.  Augustine held an im portant place in  th e  thought of
th e  Middle Ages:
"He constructed  Platonism  as th e  permanent s tru c tu re  of 
th e  thought of Western C iv i l iz a t io n . I t  i s  obvious to  
everyone th a t  Augustine shaped th e  thought fo r  Europe, in  
an in c red ib ly  complete way, fo r  th e  ensuing e igh t hundred 
y e a rs . I t  i s  ju s t  as t r u e ,  though not so ev id en t, th a t  
C h r is t ia n ity  even a f te r  th e  a ss im ila t io n  of A r is to te l ia n -  
ism in  th e  th i r te e n th  century  remained fundam entally a 
P la to n ic  philosophy."
(C arr- St.Aug. as P h il .  Proceed. Sixth.An.Mtg.Am.Catholic 
P h ilo s . A sso c ia tio n , 88).
S t .  Augustine agrees w ith  P lato  in  a  number of p o in ts :
(1) The world i s  th e  r e s u l t  of God's goodness. (2) Time i s  an im­
age of e te r n i ty .  (3) Time was c re a te d . (4) E v il i s  th e  negation of 
good and d isappears w ith  th e  whole view. (5) The supreme good i s  im ita ­
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t io n  of God. (6) The theory  of ex p ia tio n  in  which happiness i s  
connected w ith v i r tu e ,  and misery w ith  vice i s  a lso  held by bo th .
S t.  A ugustine, however, ta u g h t, un like P la to , th e  doc­
t r in e  of c re a tio n  ex n ih i lo :
"Bow d id s t Thou make heaven and earth?  . . .  i t  was not as 
a human worker fashioning body from b o d y ... nor d id s t Thou 
hold anything in  Thy hand wherewith to  make heaven and 
e a r th . For whence couldst Thou have what Thou hadst not 
made whereof to  make anything? Therefore Thou d id s t 
speak and they  were made, and in  Thy Word Thou madest 
th ese  th in g s ."  (Confessions, XI, v ) .
While P lato  in  the  Timaeus r e la te s  th a t  th e  world was 
crea ted  by secondary gods working under the  d ire c tio n  of th e  sov­
ere ign  God, S t. Augustine taught th a t  God crea ted  th e  world d i r ­
e c tly  and w ithout the  a id  o f in term ed ia te  ag en ts . The gods and 
th e  angels are  not th e  c re a to rs  of anim als any more than  th e  l a ­
bourers are  the  c re a to rs  of the  crops and th e  t r e e s .
(De C iv ita te  D ei, X ll, x x i i i ) .
God c rea tes  out of goodness and m unificence, and not be­
cause He has need of c re a tu re s . Before He crea ted  th in g s  He wan­
te d  no th ing , and in  c rea tin g  them He added nothing to  His natures
"What, th e re fo re , could th e re  be wanting unto Thy good, 
which Thou Thyself a r t ,  although th ese  th in g s  had never 
b e e n .. .  th e  which Thou madest not out of any want, but out 
of th e  p len itu d e  of Thy goodness? . . .  For to  Thee, being 
p e r fe c t ,  t h e i r  im perfection  i s  d isp le a s in g , and th e re fo re  
were they p e rfec ted  by Thee, and were p leasing  unto Thee; 
but not as i f  Thou wert im p erfec t, and wert to  be p e r fe c t­
ed in  th e i r  p e rfe c tio n ."  (Confessione, X l l l ,  i v ) .
In  rep ly  to  those who a s se r te d  th a t  because God i s  e te r ­
na l and immutable, His a c ts  must be e te rn a l and immutable, and 
th e re fo re  th e  c re a tio n  must have ex is ted  from a l l  e te r n i ty ,  thus 
destroy ing  th e  id ea  of c re a tio n , S t .  Augustine teaches th a t  tim e
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too  was c rea te d .
We are  not in te re s te d  in  follow ing 8 t .  Augustine fu r th e r  
in  connection w ith t h i s  th e s i s ,  because th e  arguments he develops 
are  not proofs fo r  th e  ex istence of God. His views of c re a tio n  
are  included here because of th e  in flu en ce  he had on thought dur­
ing th e  middle ages, and because of th e  r e la t io n  they bear to  the 
problem of God's ex istence in  th e  h is to ry  of though t.
The O ntological Proof developed by S t.  Anselm of Canter­
bury i s  an im portant one to  co n sid e r. There are  sev era l ways of 
s ta tin g  th i s  ce leb ra ted  argument. I  s h a ll  give two statem ents of 
i t ,  because i t  seems th a t  a  good deal of th e  conv ic tion  c a rr ie d  by 
th e  proof depends on th e  way i t  i s  worded.
(1) You cannot have an id ea  of a p e rfe c t being un less 
th a t  being e x is ts .
(2) The being of which you have an id ea  i s  not a  p e rfec t 
being un less i t  e x is ts ;  and i f  you can imagine the  case of a  per­
fe c t being th a t  does not e x i s t ,  then  th a t  being would not be per­
f e c t ;  and i f  i t  d id n 't  e x i s t ,  you could not have an id ea  of i t .
The best quo ta tion  I  have been able to  fin d  g iv ing  a t  a 
glance S t .  Anselm's own statem ent of h is  famous argument i s  as f o l l ­
ows :
"Certe id  quo^cog itari nequifc, non p o te s t esse in  solo in -  
r t e l l e c tu .  Si enim vel in  solo in te l l e c tu  e s t p o te s t c o g it-  
a r i ,  esse e t in  r e ,  quod majus e s t .  Si ergo id  quo majus 
c o g ita r i  p o tes t e s t  in  solo in te l l e c tu ,  id  ipsum quo majus 
c o g ita r i  non p o tes t e s t quo majus c o g ita r i  p o te s t .  Sed 
c e r te  hoc esse non p o tes t e x is te re ;  ergo procul dubio a l i -  
quod quo m ajus, c o g ita r i  non v a le t e t in  in te l le c tu  e t in  
r e . ” (Proslogium Sive Fides Quaerens In te lle c tu m ).
S t.  Anselm's argument has been supported and a ttack ed  from
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h is  day to  th e  p re se n t. S t .  Thomas Aquinas, Richard of M iddleton, 
and Kant, fo r  example, a ttacked  i t .  S t .  Thomas a ttack ed  i t  on th e  
ground th a t  everyone does not n e c e ssa rily  mean by th e  term  "Bod" a 
being than which no g re a te r  can be conceived, and th a t  even g ran t-  
such an understanding , His re a l  ex istence would not follows
" . . . t h i s  p ro o f, according to  him (S t. Thomas), con tains in  
fa c t two main flaw s.
"The f i r s t  i s  to  suppose th a t  everyone n ec e ssa rily  means 
by the  te rn  'God* a being than which no g re a te r  can be con­
ceived . Now, many of th e  an c ien ts  considered th a t  our un- 
verse  was God, and amongst a l l  the  in te rp re ta t io n s  enumera­
te d  by S t.  John Damascene, th e re  i s  none which amounts to  
th e  d e f in it io n  under d iscu ss io n . For a l l  such minds th e  
ex istence of God could not be evident a p r io r i .  Secondly, 
even g ran ting  th a t  by th e  word ’God* everybody understood 
a being than  which no g re a te r  could be conceived, th e  re a l 
ex istence of such a being would not n ec e ssa rily  fo llow . I f  
we grasp in  our mind th e  meaning of th ese  words, i t  does 
not follow  th a t  God e x is t s ,  except in  our mind. The nec­
essary  ex istence of a being than  which no g re a te r  can be 
conceived, i s  th e re fo re  necessary only in  our mind, and 
only a f te r  th e  above d e f in it io n  has been accepted; but i t  
follow s by no means th a t  th i s  be ing , so conceived, possess­
es a  re a l  and de fac to  ex is te n c e . There i s  th e re fo re , no 
co n trad ic tio n  in  a s se r tin g  th a t  God does not e x is t ."
(G ilson- The Philosophy of St.Thomas Aquinas, 41).
Guanilo, a monk of Marmontiers in  Touraine o ffe red  prac­
t i c a l l y  th e  same o b jec tio n , and used a comparison to  s treng then
h is  cases th a t  of an is la n d  than  which one can conceive none more
*
b e a u tifu l;  and he s ta te s  th a t  th i s  is la n d  must th e re fo re  e x is t  i f  
S t .  Anselm's argument i s  to  be accep ted . Kant sa id  th a t  I  can 
have an id ea  of a sum of money, but i t  d o esn 't put the  money in  my 
pocket.
We s h a ll  see- l a t e r  th a t  th ese  o b jec tions a r is e  from a mis­
conception of the  argument. On th e  o ther hand, th e  argument was 
considered v a lid  by such g ian ts  as th e  follow ings W illiam of Aux- 
e r r e ,  Richard of F ish ae re , Alexander of H ales, John Peeham, S t.  Bon-
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av en tu re , G iles of Rome, Mather of Aqua S p arta , W illiam Ware, Spin­
oza, Hegel, and D escartes.
I  s h a ll  now s ta te  the  argument in  my own way, and then 
consider th e  ob jections th a t  have been ra ised  ag a in st i t :
I  e i th e r  have th e  id ea  of a  p e rfec t being or I  have n o t.
I f  I  have, then  I  have to  g ran t th a t  my id ea  of a  p e rfec t being con­
ta in s  th e  a t t r ib u te  of r e a l  ex is ten c e . Otherwise my id ea  i s  th a t  
of a p o ssib le  being only , and th e re fo re  I  cannot say th a t  I  have 
th e  idea  of a p e rfec t being . E xternal reference  i s  in h eren t in  
th e  nature of judgment i t s e l f .  A judgment always r e la te s  i t s e l f  
to  some assumed order of f a c ts  and r e la t io n s .  I t  does not p re­
sume to  make them, but simply fin d s  and rep o rts  them. To account 
fo r th i s  ex te rn a l reference in  our o rd inary  judgments i s  one of the  
most d i f f i c u l t  problems of philosophy. So f a r  as our problem i s  
concerned, I  merdly note th a t  when I  make such judgments a s :  "The 
sun i s  warm", "Gold i s  yellow ", or "Grass i s  g reen", i t  seems th a t  
my in te l le c tu a l  assen t to  th e  judgment and o u ter reference  depend 
on an accumulation of circum stances or in s ta n c e s . But th e re  are 
o th er judgments in  which th i s  i s  not t r u e .  For example, i f  I  com­
prehend th e  whole, I  cannot help but give my assen t to  th e  s ta te ­
ment th a t  the  sum of th e  p a r ts  i s  equal to  th e  whole. I f  I  com­
prehend ’e q u ila te ra l  t r i a n g le ' I  have to  agree to  th e  e q u a lity  of 
th e  s id e6 . The kind of judgment found i n vS t. Anselm's argument an- 
wers to  t h i s  l a t t e r  ty p e . The very terms them selves carry  w ith 
them th e i r  own guaran tee , and compel a s se n t.
For S t. Anselm, the  t r u th  th a t  God e x is ts  i s  a t r u th  of
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t h i s  k ind . We mean by th e  term ’God' something than  which we 
cannot conceive anything g re a te r .  But something th a t  e x is ts  a t 
th e  same time in  our mind and in  r e a l i ty  i s  g re a te r  than  some­
th in g  e x is tin g  in  our minds only.
The f i r s t  ob jec tio n  of S t. Thomas th a t  many of th e  an­
c ie n ts  did not mean a p e rfec t being when they used th e  term  ’God' 
does not apply , because i t  does not prove th a t  they did not have 
the  id ea  of a p e rfec t being . In  any case , th e re  does e x is t  the  
idea  of a p e rfec t being , and th e re fo re  the  argument i s  not a f fe c ­
te d .
To the  second ob jec tio n  of S t .  Thomas, th a t  even i f  one 
had th e  id ea  of a p e rfec t being , such a being need not n e ce ssa rily  
have r e a l  ex is ten ce , I  rep ly  th a t  th e  idea  of a p e rfec t being in ­
cludes th e  a t t r ib u te  of r e a l  e x is te n c e . To deny ex istence except 
in  th e  mind, l im its  th e  idea  of p e rfe c t and th e re fo re  destroys the 
id ea  of p e rfe c t being .
To G uanilo 's example of th e  most b e a u tifu l is la n d , I  r e ­
spond th a t  th e  case i s  not p a r a l le l .  An is la n d  i s  a lready  lim ite d .
to
The argument ap p lies  only^the case of a p e rfec t being . Anselm’ s 
argument i s  only v a lid  when app lied  to  a p e rfec t being .
Another frequent o b jec tio n  brought ag a in st the  O ntologic­
a l  Proof i s  th a t  i t  contains a jump from th e  id e a l  to  the  r e a l  o r­
d e r . I t  a l l  depends on what i s  meant by the jump? i f  i t  means 
th a t  th e re  i s  a  reference to  a r e a l i ty  ex te rn a l to  th e  mind, then 
i t  may be sa id  th a t  we are co n tin u a lly  jumping from the  lo g ic a l  to  
the  re a l  o rd e r. S t .  Anselm would say th a t  th i s  i s  merely begging
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th e  questions th a t  i s  what th e  whole argument i s  about. I f  th e  
jump from th e  id e a l to  the re a l  order i s  i l lo g ic a l*  then  th e  point
i s  to  show where th e re  i s  a break in  the  lo g ic . But to  say th a t
th e  argument i s  in v a lid  because th e re  i s  a jump from th e  id e a l to
th e  re a l  order i s  an ob jec tio n  only* and not a r e fu ta t io n .
We now come to  th e  arguments put fo rth  by S t. Thomas A- 
quinas fo r the ex istence of God. They are  fiv e  in  number: The
Proof of th e  F irs t  Mover, The Proof from E ff ic ie n t  Causes, The 
Proof from P o te n tia , Proof from th e  Degrees of Being, Proof from 
a C onsideration of the  Government of Things.
The Proof of the F i r s t  Mover may be s ta te d  as fo llow s:
" I t  i s  c e r ta in -  and our senses w itness to  th e  f a c t-  
th a t  th e re  i s  movement in  the  w orldj everything th a t  moves 
i s  se t in  motion by something. Nothing, in  f a c t ,  i s  in
motion unless i t  be in  potency w ith  regard to  th a t  towards
which i t  i s  movedj and nothing per co n tra , moves anything 
except as i t  i s  in  a c t .  To se t a th in g  in  motion means to  
cause i t  to  pass from potency to  a c t .  Now, a th in g  can 
only be brought from potency to  ac t by something which i s  
in  a c t .  For in s ta n c e , i t  i s  heat in  ac t (fo r  example f i r e )  
which makes th e  wood, which i s  only p o te n tia lly  h o t,  ac tu ­
a l ly  h o t, and to  th a t  e x te n t, moves and a l t e r s  i t .  But i t  
i s  im possible fo r a th in g  to  be both in  potency and in  act
a t  the  same time in  reference  to  th e  same th in g s . Thus
an a c tu a lly  hot th in g  cannot a t  th e  same time be a c tu a lly  
co ld , but only p o te n tia l ly  co ld . I t  i s  th e re fo re  imposs­
ib le  fo r a th in g  to  be, a t  th e  same timeand reference  to  
th e  same th in g s , both mover and moved, i . e .  se t in  motion 
by i t s e l f .  Whence we see th a t  everything th a t  i s  in  mo­
t io n ,  i s  moved by something e ls e .  I f ,  on th e  o th e r hand, 
th a t  by which a th in g  i s  moved, i s  i t s e l f  in  movement, the  
reason i s  th a t  i t  i s ,  in  i t s  tu rn ,  se t in  motion by some 
o th e r mover, which i s  again  moved by another th ing  and so 
on. But i t  i s  im possible to  reg re ss  in  t h i s  way ad in f in ­
itu m , because, in  th a t  case , th e re  would be no f i r s t  mover, 
nor consequently o ther movers, fo r  th e  second mover im­
p a r ts  movement only because th e  f i r s t  se t i t  in  m otion, as 
a  s tic k  moves only because th e  hand im parts movement to  i t .  
To explain  movement i t  i s  consequently necessary to  reg ress  
to  a  f i r s t  mover which i s  i t s e l f  not se t in  motion by any­
th in g , i . e .  to  God.M (Summa Theologica, 1 . 2 ,3 ) .
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
The Proof of th e  F ir s t  Mover i s  not complete u n t i l  two 
p ro p o sitio n s  involved in  i t  have been estab lished*  The f i r s t  
i s  th a t  everything in  motion rece iv es  movement by some o ther 
th in g , and the  second iB th a t  an in f in i t e  s e r ie s  i s  im possib le .
The l a t t e r  i s  an ob jection  brought ag a in st the proof by Kant, as 
we s h a l l  see l a t e r  on, when he says th a t  th e  im p o ss ib ility  of an 
in f in i t e  s e r ie s  has not been proved.
Since the  proof of the  F i r s t  Mover was developed from 
A r is to t le  by S t.  Thomas, i t  i s  th e  A r is to te l ia n  arguments fo r  both 
of th e  above p ropositions th a t  I  s h a ll  now p re se n t.
Three hypotheses are  presupposed in  regard to  th e  f i r s t  
p ro p o sitio n s  (1) For a  th in g  to  be in  motion of i t s e l f ,  i t  must 
con tain  in  i t s e l f  th e  p r in c ip le  of i t s  movementj otherw ise i t  i s  
ev iden tly  se t in  motion by some o th e r thing* (2) The th in g  must be 
moved in  t o to ,  i . e .  i t  must be in  motion in  re sp ec t of i t s  whole 
and not in  respect of one of i t s  p a r t s .  (3) The th in g  in  question  
must be d iv is ib le  and have p a r t s ,  since everything th a t  i s  in  motion 
i s  d iv is ib le .
The proof of th e  f i r s t  p ro p o sitio n , based on th e  f i r s t  hy­
p o th e s is , i s  s ta te d  as follow s by Gilsons
"That which we assume to  be moving i t s e l f , i s  moved in  to ­
t o ,  hence th e  repose of one of i t s  p a r ts  im plies th e  repose 
of th e  whole. Indeed, i f  one p a rt remained a t r e s t ,  while 
another i s  in  m otion, i t  would no longer be th e  whole which 
i s  se t in  motion in  to to ,  but one p a rt which i s  in  m otion, 
w hile the  o th er would be a t r e s t .  Now, nothing th e  repose 
of which depends on th e  repose of another th in g , moves of 
i t s e l f .  I f ,  in  f a c t ,  th e  repose of one th in g  depends on the  
repose of an o th er, of n ecess ity  i t s  movement a lso  depends on 
th e  movement of an o th er, and consequently , i t  does not se t 
i t s e l f  in  m otion. And since th e  th in g  which we assume to  
be in  motion does not se t i t s e l f  in  m otion, i t  follow s nec­
e s s a r i ly  th a t  everything in  motion i s  moved by another th in g .
(G ilson- The P h il ,  of S t .  Thos. 4 9 ).
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The second proof i s  s ta te d  as followss
"Now* everything th a t  i s  in  motion i s  se t in  motion 
e i th e r  by i t s e l f  o r by ac c id e n t. I f  moved by a c c id e n t, 
i t  does not se t i t s e l f  in  m otion; i f  i t  s e ts  i t s e l f  in  
motion i t  i s  moved e i th e r  by v io lence or by n a tu re ; i f  
i t  i s  moved by natu re  i t  i s  moved e i th e r  by i t s  own natu re  
l ik e  the anim al, or by an o th e r, l ik e  th e  heavy or l ig h t  
bod ies. Thus a l l  th a t  i s  in  motion i s  moved by something 
e ls e ."  (G ilson- P h il ,  of S t .  Thos. 49 ,5 0 ).
The th i rd  proof i s  a lso  c ite d  in  th e  same work, page 50s
"Nothing i s  a t  th e  same tim e , in  re fe ren ce  to  th e  same 
th in g s ,  both in  ac t and in  potency. But everything i s  in
potency in  as fa r  as i t  i s  se t in  m otion, fo r  movement i s
th e  ac t of th a t  which i s  in  potency, in  as f a r  as i t  i s  in  
potency. Now a l l  th in g s  which im part movement a re  in so fa r  
in  a c t ,  since nothing a c ts  except i t  be in  a c t .  Conseq­
uen tly  nothing i s  a t  th e  same tim e and in  resp ec t of the
same th in g s , both mover in  ac t and moveds th e re fo re ,  no­
th in g  moves of i t s e l f . "
A r is to tle  a lso  g ives th re e  proofs of th e  second proposi­
tio n s  th a t  an i n f in i t e  reg ress  i s  im possible-
(1) An in f in i t e  number of bodies must be assumed; and 
since a  body which moves and i s  moved i s  se t in  motion a t th e  same 
tim e as i t  im parts movement, a l l  th e  bodies must move sim ultaneous­
ly  i f  one moves. The r e s u l t  would be an in f in i t e  number of bodies 
moving sim ultaneously in  a  f in i t e  tim e , which i s  absurd . Another 
way of s ta t in g  th i s  i s  to  say th a t  since c o n tig u ity  of bodies i s  
necessary  fo r  m otion, th e re  would r e s u l t  a  s in g le  i n f in i t e  th in g  in  
motitrn in  a  f in i t e  tim e , which i s  a lso  absurd .
(2) In th e  absence of a f i r s t  mover, a l l  o th er th in g s  in  
th e  s e r ie s  would have to  function  as in term ed ia te  movers, and th e re ­
fo re  th e re  could be no movement in  th e  w orld.
(3) By in v e rtin g  th e  order of the  terms of (2 ) , we a rr iv e  
a t  th e  same absurd r e s u l t ,  v iz .  th a t  th e re  would be no movement in  
th e  w orld.
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There are those who m aintain  th a t  th e  f i r s t  mover need 
not be God. S t .  Thomas would not expect assen t to  th e  f i r s t  mover 
being God u n t i l  th e  whole of th e  proof had been developed through 
a co n sid e ra tio n  of th e  a t t r ib u te s  such a f i r s t  mover would have to  
have, such as e te r n i ty ,  s im p lic ity , a s e i ty ,  u n ity , e tc .
There i s  ju s t  one more thought to  add to  a  co n s id e ra tio n
of the  Proof of a  F i r s t  Mover, and th a t  concerns th e  r e la t io n  of
th e  in f in i t e  reg ress  to  tim e . S t .  Thomas does not speak of the  
im p o ss ib ility  of an in f in i t e  reg re ss  in  tim e, but when th e  universe 
i s  considered; and an in f in i t e  reg ress  i s  seen to  be im possible 
because the  se r ie s  of causes in  th e  universe are  h ie ra rc h ic a lly  
arranged .
The second g rea t proof of S t .  Thomas i s  th a t  from e f f ic ­
ie n t  causes, in  which th e  procedure i s  through a s e r ie s  of causes
back to  th e  f i r s t  uncaused Cause, or God. This i s  th e  same meth­
od as in  th e  f i r s t  p ro o f, but a d if fe re n t  order of r e a l i ty  i s  made 
th e  b a s is  of i t ,  and th e  im p o ss ib ility  o f an in f in i t e  reg ress  i s  
again  invoked and made p a rt of th e  p ro o f.
I f  th e  p r in c ip le  of c a u sa lity  were not adm itted , but in  
p lace of i t ,  the  th e s is  th a t  th e re  i s  no necessary connection be­
tween what we c a l l  cause and what we c a l l  e f f e c t ,  th e  proof i s  
weakened un less i t  can be demonstrated th a t  what we c a l l  cause and 
e f fe c t  i s  not merely an u n re la ted  s e r ie s  of movements. This poin t 
w i l l  come up again  when we consider some modern p h ilo so p h ers , p a r t­
ic u la r ly  Hume.
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The th i r d  proof of S t. Thomas i s  based on P o te n tia , or 
th e  a p titu d e  to  change. Actus i s  th e  fu lf ilm en t of such an ap­
t i tu d e .  A change of any kind i s  a movement from P o te n tia  to  Ac­
tu s .  I t  i s  evident th a t  th e re  i s  change in  th e  w orld. P o ten tia  
precedes aetus in  th e  same being . In  th e  s t r i c t  sense , ac tus 
must precede p o te n tia ,  f o r ,  in  order to  change, a  th in g  must be 
acted  on, i . e .  i t  supposes a being in  a c tu . No being in  th e  
world has in  i t s e l f  a  s u f f ic ie n t  reason to  pass from potency to  
ac t of i t s e l f .  Hence th e  change from potency to  ac t i s  depend­
ent on another being . Since an in f in i t e  reg ress  i s  im possib le ,
i t  i s  necessary to  p o s it th e  Supreme A ctus, Actus Purus, God, Who 
i s  not in  P o te n tia , but Who i s  N ecessary.
The fo u rth  proof goes from evidences of p e rfe c tio n  in  
th e  u n iv e rse , back through g re a te r  and g re a te r  degrees of p e rfec ­
t io n  in  b e in g s, to  th e  U ltim ate P e rfe c tio n , God. This proof i s  
a lso  dependent upon th e  im p o ss ib ility  of an in f in i t e  re g re s s .
The f i f t h  proof of th e  quinque v iae s ta r t s  w ith eviden­
ces of o rder in  th e  u n iv e rse , back to  th e  Supreme O rderer, God.
The la s t  four proofs a re  dependent on th e  f i r s t  p ro o f.
A ll th e  proofs depend upon (1) th e  admission th a t  knowledge has 
as i t s  beginning th e  observations of th e  senses: "N ih il e s t  in
in te l l e c tu  qui non p riu s  f u e r i t  in  sensu." (2) th e  admission th a t  
an i n f in i t e  reg ress  i s  im possib le , and (3) th e  acceptance of a 
necessary connection between cause and e f f e c t .
The Problem in  Modern Philosophy
D escartes ip  th e  f i r s t  ph ilosopher in  whom we a re  i n t e r ­
ested  when we come to  a d iscussion  of th e  problem of God in  modern
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philosophy. One reason fo r  t h i s  i s  th a t  h is  philosophy contains 
many elements th a t  were found in  mediaeval and ancien t philosophy, 
but th e  more im portant reason i s  th a t  h is  method was e n t i re ly  o r i ­
g in a l and used only by h im self. I t  may be sa id  th a t  h is  method 
of philosophic doubt, which accep ts as proved only th a t  which i s  
made s e lf -e v id e n t,  w hile i t  had been used b e fo re , received  a t r e ­
mendous impetus under D escartes, to  such an ex ten t th a t  i t  i s  re ­
cognized to-day  as being th e  philosophic method par ex ce llen ce .
The method i s  a lso  unique in  th a t  i t  s t a r t s  from thought and the  
th in k in g  sub jec t as a  b a s is  fo r  ph ilo so p h ica l reason ing . I  cannot 
doubt my own thought; fo r  my very doubt i s  a though t, and I  who 
th ink  or doubt must e x is t ,  because i f  I  did not e x i s t ,  I  could not 
th in k  nor doubt. "Cogito, ergo sum.”
Following out h is  method of philosophic doubt, D escartes, 
by analyzing the  content of h is  own mind, gave th re e  proofs fo r the 
ex istence of God. The f i r s t  of th ese  has been c a lled  th e  proof 
"A C ontingentia M entis", and can be s ta te d  as fo llow s:
I  have in  my mind numerous ideas such as m agnitude, s i tu ­
a t io n , substance, d u ra tio n , num ber,colours, h e a t, co ld , wax, wood, 
beauty , ju s t ic e ,  e tc .  But th ese  are  e i th e r  substances, modes of 
substances, or ideas of corporeal th in g s ; and since I  am a sub­
stance m yself, i t  i s  po ssib le  th a t  th e  ideas I  have of them might 
have come from m yself. There remains th e  id ea  of God; and since 
I  am a substance, I  might have th e  id ea  of substance from my own 
being , but I  could not have th e  idea  of an in f in i t e  substance. The 
only conclusion th e re fo re , i s  th a t  God e x is t s ,  s ince th e re  must be 
as much r e a l i ty  in  the  e f f ic ie n t  and t o t a l  cause as in  th e  e f f e c t .
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The follow ing i s  th e  proof in  the  words of D escartes*
"By the  name God, I  understand a substance i n f i n i t e ,  
( e te rn a l ,  im m utable), independent, all-know ing, a ll-pow er­
fu l*  and by which I  m yself, and every o th er th in g  th a t  ex­
i s t s ,  i f  any such th e re  be , were c re a ted . But th e se  pro­
p e r t ie s  are  so g re a t ,  and e x c e lle n t, th a t  the  more a t te n ­
t iv e ly  I  consider them th e  le s s  I  fe e l  persuaded th a t  the 
id ea  I  have of them owes i t s  o r ig in  to  m yself a lone . And 
th u s  i t  i s  ab so lu te ly  necessary to  conclude, from a l l  th a t  
I  have before sa id , th a t  God e x is ts ;  fo r  though the id ea  
of substance be in  my mind owing to  t h i s ,  th a t  I  myself am 
a substance, I  should n o t, however, have the  id ea  of an in ­
f in i t e  substance, seeing I  am a f in i t e  being , unless i t  
were given me by some substance in  r e a l i ty  i n f i n i t e .
"And I  must not imagine th a t  I  do not apprehend th e  in ­
f in i t e  by a tru e  id e a , but only by th e  negation of th e  f in ­
i t e ,  in  th e  same way th a t  I  comprehend repose and darkness 
by th e  negation of motion and l ig h t ;  s in c e , on th e  con tra­
ry ,  I  c le a r ly  perceive' th a t  th e re  i s  more r e a l i ty  in  th e  
in f in i t e  substance than  in  th e  f i n i t e ,  and th e re fo re  th a t  
in  some way I  possess th e  percep tion  (notion) of th e  in f in ­
i t e  before th a t  of th e  f i n i t e ,  th a t  i s ,  th e  percep tion  of
God before th a t  of m yself, fo r how could I  know th a t  I
doubt, d e s ire , or th a t  something i s  wanting to  me, and th a t  
I  am not wholly p e r fe c t ,  i f  I  possessed no id ea  of a being 
more p e rfec t than  m yself, by comparison of which I  knew 
th e  d e fic ie n c ie s  of my nature?
(D escartes- M editation 111, Of God; That He E x is ts ) .
In  the  above p ro o f, D escartes borrowed from th e  Scholas­
t i c s  th e  p r in c ip le ,  "That th e re  must be as much r e a l i ty  in  th e  e f­
f ic ie n t  and t o t a l  cause as in  th e  e f f e c t" .  I t  a lso  assumes th e  
ex istence of a necessary connection between cause and e f f e c t ;  and 
both of th ese  have been disputed  in  th e  h is to ry  of philosophy.
While he concludes th a t  only an a c tu a lly  i n f in i t e  r e a l i ty
could exp la in  th e  r e a l i ty  of th e  id ea  of the  in f in i t e  in  th e  mind, 
D escartes does not o v e r lo o k  the  n ecess ity  of seeking an explanation  
of th i s  id ea  in  some o ther way. He examines th re e  explanations* 
(1) That th e  idea  might come through negation of th e  f in i t e ;  (2) 
That th e  id ea  might have come through a combination of causes ra th ­
e r than  from one s in g le  being , God; (3) That a l l  th ese  p e rfec tio n s
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might e x is t  p o te n tia l ly  in  m yself, and th a t  I  might have secured 
th e  ideas of them through in d e f in i te ly  adding to  them.
To the  f i r s t  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  th a t  of negation , D escartes 
re p l ie s  th a t  th e re  i s  more r e a l i ty  in  an in f in i t e  substance than  
in  a  f i n i t e  one, and thus the  no tion  of th e  in f in i t e  i s  in  my 
mind before th a t  of th e  f i n i t e ;  and in  ad d itio n  th e  idea  could 
not-be derived from th e  n o n -ex is ten t, s ince i t  has more r e a l i ty  
than any o th er id ea .
To the second p o s s ib i l i ty ,  th a t  of m u ltip lic a tio n , 
D escartes says th a t  th e  u n ity , s im p lic ity , and in s e p a ra b il i ty  of 
a l l  th e  th in g s  which are  in  God c o n s titu te  one of Hie ch ie f  per­
fe c tio n s , and th a t  a m u ltip lic a tio n  of causes could not have put 
th e  id ea  of the  u n ity  of th ese  p e rfec tio n s  in to  my mind.
To answer th e  th i r d  p o s s ib i l i ty ,  D escartes says th a t  my 
knowledge i s  seen to  be im perfect in  th a t  i t  grows g rad u a lly , and 
continues to  in c re a se . God, however, i s  i n f i n i t e ,  and cannot add 
anything to  His supreme p e rfe c tio n . The idea  of an a c tu a lly  in ­
f in i t e  being cannot be caused by a being th a t  has only p o te n tia l  
ex is ten c e .
The second proof put fo r th  by D escartes i s  an answer to  
th e  q u estio n : ’’Would I ,  who possess the  idea  of God, e x is t  i f
th e re  were no God?” He r e p l ie s :
*
"And I  ask , from whom could I ,  in  th a t  case , derive my 
ex istence? Perhaps from m yself, or from my p a re n ts , or 
from some o th er causes le s s  p e rfe c t than God; fo r  any­
th in g  more p e r fe c t ,  or even equal to  God, cannot be 
thought or imagined. But i f  I  myself were th e  au thor of 
my being . . .  I  should have bestowed upon myself every per­
fe c tio n  of which I  possess th e  id e a , and I  should thus be 
God." ( D escartes, M editations,. I l l ) .
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To counter the  ob jec tio n  th a t  my ex istence might have 
come from some being le s s  than God, D escartes w rite s  as fo llow s:
"But perhaps th e  being upon whom I  am dependent, i s  not 
God, and I  have been produced e i th e r  by my p a re n ts , o r by 
some causes le s s  p e rfe c t than  D eity . This cannot be: fo r ,  
as I  have before s a id , i t  i s  p e rfe c tly  evident th a t  th e re  
must a t le a s t  be as much r e a l i ty  in  the  cause as in  i t s  
e ffec t}  and acco rd ing ly , since I  am a th in k in g  th in g , and 
possess in  myself an id ea  of God, whatever in  the  end be 
th e  cause of my e x is ten c e , i t  must of n ecess ity  be adm itted 
th a t  i t  i s  likew ise a  th in k in g  being , and th a t  i t  possesses 
in  i t s e l f  th e  idea  and a l l  th e  p e rfec tio n s  I  a t t r ib u te  to  
D eity . Then i t  may again be inqu ired  whether t h i s  cause 
owes i t s  huum o r ig in  and ex istence to  i t s e l f ,  or to  some 
o th er cause. For i f  i t  be s e lf - e x is te n t ,  i t  follow s from 
what I  have before la id  down, th a t  th i s  cause i s  God; fo r 
since  i t  possesses th e  p e rfe c tio n  of s e lf -e x is te n c e , i t  
must lik ew ise , w ithout doubt, have th e  power of a c tu a lly  
possessing every p e rfec tio n  of which i t  has th e  id e a , -  in  
o th er words, a l l  th e  p e rfe c tio n s  I  conceive to  belong to  
God. But i f  i t  owe i t s  ex istence to  another cause than 
i t s e l f ,  we demand ag a in , fo r  a s im ila r  reason , whether th i s  
second cause e x is ts  of i t s e l f  or through some o th e r , u n t i l ,  
from stage to  s ta g e , we a t  leng th  a r r iv e  a t  an u ltim ate  
cause, which w il l  be God. And i t  i s  q u ite  m anifest th a t  in  
t h i s  m atter th e re  can be no in f in i t e  reg ress  of causes, see­
ing th a t  th e  question  ra ise d  re sp ec ts  not so much the  cause 
which once produced me, as th a t  by which I  am a t t h i s  p res­
ent moment conserved." (M editations, 111).
In  order to  avoid th e  id ea  of in f in i t e  re g re s s , D escartes 
b rings in  th e  idea  of conservation , and s ta te s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  th a t  i t  
req u ire s  as g rea t a  power to  conserve, a f te r  c re a tio n , as i t  re ­
quired to  c re a te . I  do not th in k  th a t  D escartes proves t h i s ;  I  
f e e l  th a t  he takes i t  as an assum ption.
The th i rd  proof of D escartes i s  th e  O ntological Proof of 
S t .  Anselm, which has been discussed  before in  th i s  paper. I t  w il l  
be of in te r e s t  to  add, however, an ob jec tio n  and rep ly  not given 
p rev io u sly . Gassendi (1592-1655), o b jec ts  th a t  ex isten ce  i s  not 
a p e rfe c tio n , hut a form or a c t iv i ty  w ithout which th e re  can be no 
p e rfe c tio n . D escartes re p lie s  th a t  in  th e  case o f God, ex istence 
i s  t r u ly  a property  in  th e  narrowest sense, because ex istence i s
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proper to  Him a lo n e , and i t  i s  only in  Him th a t  ex istence i s  p art 
of essence.
The th ree  proofs brought fo rth  by D escartes appear to  me 
th e  O ntological proof of S t .  Anselm a l l  over again . Both s ta r t  
w ith  the  observation  th a t  I  have in  my mind the id ea  of a p e rfec t 
being , and both deduce th a t  I  could not have the  id ea  of a p e rfec t 
being un less such a being e x is t s .  To o ther beings th e  argument 
would not apply , and both philosophers are agreed on t h i s .  Des­
c a r te s  s ta r t s  w ith an an a ly s is  of th e  content of h is  mind, while 
S t .  Anselm, as fa r  as th e  proof of God i s  concerned, appears to  
have done th e  same. I  conclude, th e re fo re , th a t  D escartes merely 
s ta te d  S t. Anselm's argument in  a more e lab o ra te  way.
L eibn itz  (1646-1716) remarks th a t  the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of the 
p e rfec t being must be proved or assumed i f  we are to  in fe r  th a t  i t  
e x is ts .  D escartes assumes th a t  God i s  p o ss ib le . L e ibn itz  c a l ls  
D e sca rte s 's  proof im perfect because i t  assumes th a t  God i s  possib le  
in  H im self, and adds th a t  i f  anyone could prove t h i s ,  we should then 
have a t ru ly  mathematical proof of God’ s ex is ten c e . His attem pt 
to  se t out th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of God i s  s ta te d  as fo llow s:
"Thus God alone (or th e  necessary Being) possesses th i s  
p r iv i le g e , th a t  He must e x i s t ,  i f  He i s  p o ss ib le ; and since 
nothing can h inder th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of th a t  which includes 
no l im i ts ,  no negation , and consequently no c o n tra d ic tio n , 
th a t  alone i s  s u f f ic ie n t  to  e s ta b lis h  th e  ex istence of God 
a p r io r i .  We have likew ise proved i t  by th e  r e a l i ty  of e- 
te r n a l  t r u th s .  But we have a lso  ju s t  proved i t  a p o s te r­
i o r i  by showing t h a t ,  since contingent beings e x i s t ,  they 
can have th e i r  u ltim ate  and s u ff ic ie n t  reason only in  some 
necessary Being, who con ta ins the  reason of h is  ex istence 
in  H im self." (Monadology, 45).
L eibn itz  does not s u f f ic ie n t ly  exp lain  how i t  i s  th a t  
what does not contain  negation  does not imply c o n tra d ic tio n . He
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in tro  duces th e  cosmological argument fo r th e  ex istence  of God* 
however* from th e  p r in c ip le  of S u ff ic ie n t Reason* This method 
of p re sen ta tio n  i s  p e c u lia r  to  him:
"And as a l l  t h i s  d e ta i l  (of po ssib le  th in g s) only in ­
volves o ther a n te r io r  or more d e ta ile d  con tingencies , 
each one of which again  req u ire s  a  s im ila r  an a ly s is  in  
order to  account fo r i t ,  we have made no advance; and 
the  s u ff ic ie n t  or f in a l  reason must be ou tside of the  
s e r ie s  of th i s  d e ta i l  of contingencies ( i . e .  acc id en ta l 
cau ses), however in f in i te  th i s  s e r ie s  may be.
"And thus th e  f in a l  reason of th in g s  must be found in  
a necessary substance, in  which th e  d e ta i l  of changes ex­
i s t s  only em inently , as in  th e i r  source. And th i s  sub­
stance we c a l l  God." (Monadology, 37 and 38).
Spinoza (1632-1677) developed a proof fo r  the  ex istence 
of God through using d e f in it io n s ,  axioms, p ro p o sitio n s , and co r­
o l la r ie s  from th e  p ro p o sitio n s . I t  was thus an attem pt to  secure 
a proof in  th e  same manner as mathem atical p ro p o sitio n s  a re  demon­
s tr a te d .  I t  r e a lly  amounts to  a support of S t. Anselm's argument, 
and i s  g iven as fo llow s:
"Prop. XI. God, o r substance, co n s is tin g  of in f in i t e  
a t t r ib u te s ,  of which each expresses e te rn a l and in f in i t e  
e s s e n t ia l i ty ,  n e ce ssa rily  e x is t s .
"Proof- I f  th i s  be denied, conceive, i f  p o s s ib le , th a t  
God does not e x is t :  then  h is  essence does not involve ex­
is te n c e . But th i s  (by prop, v i i )  i s  absurd . Therefore 
God n ecessa rily  e x is ts .
"Note- "For since a b i l i ty  to  e x is t  i s  power, i t  follow s 
th a t  the  more r e a l i ty  belongs to  the  natu re  of anything 
th e  g re a te r  i s  th e  power fo r  ex istence i t  derives from i t ­
s e l f ;  and i t  a lso  follows th e re fo re , th a t  th e  being abso l­
u te ly  i n f i n i t e ,  or God, has from Himself an ab so lu te ly  in ­
f in i t e  power of ex is ten c e , and th a t  He th e re fo re  necessar­
i l y  e x is ts .  . . .  Whatever p e rfec tio n  or r e a l i ty  those th in g s  
may have which are produced by ex te rn a l causes, whether 
they co n s is t of many p a r ts  or few, they owe i t  a l l  to  the  
v ir tu e  of an ex te rn a l cause, and, th e re fo re , th e i r  e x is t ­
ence springs from th e  p e rfe c tio n  of an ex te rn a l cause alone 
and not from th e i r  own. On th e  o th er hand, whatever per­
fe c tio n  substance h as, i s  due to  no ex te rn a l cause. There­
fo re , i t s  ex istence must follow  from i t s  na tu re  a lo n e , and 
i s ,  th e re fo re , nothing e lse  than  i t s  essence. P e rfec tio n  
consequently does not prevent the. ex istence of a th in g , 
but e s ta b lish e s  i t ;  im perfec tion , on th e  o ther hand, p re­
ven ts e x is ten c e ."  (E th ic s , 1, note and Prop. X I).
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To Bossuet (1627-1704) we are  indebted fo r  p resen ting  
in  a new way the argument of P la to , proving th e  ex istence of God 
through th e  ex istence of e te rn a l t r u th s .  There are  t ru th s  which 
would not cease to  be tru e  even i f  no a p p lic a tio n  of them could 
be made by reason of the  o b jec t to  which they are a ttached  being 
n o n -e x is ten t. For example, the  t r u th  th a t  th e  angles a t the  
base of an iso sc e le s  t r ia n g le  are  equal, would s t i l l  be t ru e  i f  
such tr ia n g le s  had no r e a l i ty .  N either are th ese  tru th s  depend­
ent on th e  ex istence of a human mind, fo r  they would s t i l l  be 
tru e  i f  th e re  were no human minds. But th ese  t ru th s  must de­
pend on something, and must have ex istence somewhere. Bossuet 
says th a t  th ese  tru th s  Bubsist in  God and depend upon Him.
" I f  now I  seek to  d iscover in  what sub jec t th ese  t ru th s  
r e s id e , e te rn a l and immutable as they a re ,  I  am obliged 
to  admit the  ex istence of a being in  whom t ru th  e te rn a lly  
su b s is ts  and by whom i t  i s  fo rever comprehended; and th i s  
being must be t ru th  i t s e l f ,  and must be a l l  t r u th ,  and i t  
i s  from Him th a t  the  t r u th  i s  derived in  a l l  th a t  i s  and 
i s  comprehended ou tside of Him."
(Bossuet- Connaissance de Dieu e t de soi-meme, Ch. IV).
I t  i s  p la in  th a t  th e re  must be a rep o sito ry  fo r th ese  
t r u th s ,  not only fo r one t r u th ,  but fo r a l l ;  not only fo r  the  
simple t r u th s ,  but fo r the  most profound. No human mind could by 
any chance be th e  rep o sito ry  fo r  a l l  t r u th ,  because the  human mind 
i s  f i n i t e .  And i t  must a lso  be adm itted th a t  th e re  are many tru th s  
as yet completely unknown to  any human mind, some of which may be 
d iscovered . And t ru th  to  be apprehended, must re s id e  in  a  mind, 
because t r u th  i s  the  proper ob ject of mind. Hence th e  rep o sito ry  
of t r u th  must be an In te ll ig e n c e , e te rn a l ,  and i n f i n i t e .  This su- 
In te llig e n c e  i s  God, Who n e c e ssa rily  e x is ts .
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David Hume (1711-1776) in  h is  "An Inqu iry  Concerning Human 
Understanding" s ta te s  th a t  th e re  i s  no necessary connection between
cause and e f fe c t ;  th a t  a l l  we can p o s it in  regard to  th e  universe
i s  a succession of even ts; th a t  we in f e r  a necessary connection
through h a b i t .  Nor are our thoughts exempted! our mind i s  but a
c o lle c tio n  of mental s ta te s .
I f  t h i s  teach ing  were t r u e ,  a l l  proofs fo r  th e  ex istence 
of God would have to  be thrown o u t: not only those dependent upon
th e  p r in c ip le  of c a u sa lity  as f a r  as m a te r ia l o b jec ts  are concerned, 
but a lso  those dependent upon the  p r in c ip le  of c a u sa lity  as f a r  as 
our thoughts are  concerned. The best we should be able to  do i s  
to  say th a t  we can know nothing about whether God e x is ts  or n o t.
Hume begins by affirm ing  as "a  general p ro p o sitio n , 
which admits of no excep tion , th a t  the  knowledge of t h i s  r e la t io n  
(cause and e f fe c t)  i s  n o t, in  any in s ta n c e , a tta in e d  by reasonings 
a p r io r i ;  but a r is e s  e n t ire ly  from experience, when we fin d  th a t  
any p a r t ic u la r  o b jec ts  are constan tly  conjoined w ith  each o th e r ."  
With th a t  I  can ag ree ; i t  i s  the  same th in g  as saying th a t  exper­
ience i s  th e  source of our knowledge. His example of th e  b i l l i a r d
b a l l  w i l l  give an idea  of the  r e s t  of h is  d o c tr in e :
"When I  se e , fo r in s ta n c e , a  B i l l ia r d - b a l l  moving in  a 
s tr a ig h t  l in e  towards ano ther; even suppose motion in  the 
second b a l l  should by acciden t be suggested to  me, as the
re s u l t  of th e i r  contact or im pulse; may I  not conceive,
th a t  a hundred d if fe re n t events might as w ell follow  from 
th a t  cause? May not both th ese  b a l ls  remain a t abso lu te  
r e s t?  May not th e  f i r s t  b a l l  re tu rn  in  a  s tr a ig h t  l in e ,  
or leap  o ff  from th e  second in  any lin e  or d ire c tio n ?  A ll 
th ese  suppositions are  co n s is ten t and conceivab le . Why 
then  should we give the  p reference to  one, which i s  no more 
co n s is ten t or conceivable than  th e  re s t?  A ll our reason­
ings a p r io r i  w il l  never be ab le  to  show us any foundation 
fo r  th i s  p re fe ren ce ."  (Section IV, p art 1 , Cone.Hum. U nder.).
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To answer Hume's q u es tio n s , I  rep ly  th a t  i t  i s  q u ite  
p o ssib le  th a t  any of th e  th in g s  he suggests might happen to  th e
b i l l i a r d  b a l ls  used in  th e  example. But what I  do know about 
t h i s  and every o ther two conjoined ev en ts , i s  t h a t ,  given th e  
f i r s t  even t, something n ec e ssa rily  must r e s u l t , and th a t  th e re ­
fore th e re  i s  not only a  conjunction of th e  two ev en ts , but a 
connection , and a necessary one, which we c a l l  th e  e f fe c t  of the  
f i r s t  event known as the  cause. Suppose th a t  fo r  th e  f i r s t  time 
in  my l i f e  I  were asked th e  q u estio n : "What w i l l  happen i f  I
apply t h i s  flame to  th a t  b a r re l  of gunpowder?" I  might c e r ta in ly  
not know th a t  th e re  would be an explosion; but I  should ju s t  as 
c e r ta in ly  know th a t  something would happen- th a t  th e re  would be 
some e f f e c t ,  even i f  th a t  e f fe c t  were nothing a t a l l  as f a r  as I  
might be ab le to  t e l l .  The c h ild , who fo r th e  f i r s t  tim e puts 
h is  f in g e r  in  th e  flame of a cand le , knows in  so f a r  as a ch ild  
can know th a t  something w il l  r e s u l t .  That th e  a c tu a l r e s u l t  i s  
not what he expected makes no d iffe re n c e : the  poin t i s  th a t  he
expected something to  happen. I  agree w ith Hume th a t  the p a r t ic ­
u la r  r e s u l t  can never be p red ic ted  w ith  abso lu te  c e r ta in ty ,  and 
th a t  i t  i s  through h ab it we a r r iv e  a t p a r t ic u la r  conclusions as to  
what w il l  happen when you have a conjunction of p a r t ic u la r  bod ies.
A p e rfe c tly  reasonable conclusion to  draw, th e re fo re , i s  th a t  th e re  
i s  a necessary connection between cause and e f fe c t ;  p a r t ic u la r  
causes may give r i s e  to  p a r t ic u la r  e f fe c ts  d if fe re n t from what was 
expected, but th e  general p r in c ip le  of c a u sa lity  remains u n a ssa il­
able .
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Kant (1724-1804) sub jected  th e  proofs fo r  th e  ex istence 
of God to  c r i t ic is m , and then  in troduces one of h is  own known as 
th e  moral p roo f. He reduces previous proofs to  th re e ,  v iz .  th e  
o n to lo g ic a l, th e  cosm ological, and th e  p h y sico -th eo lo g ica l.
To the  o n to lo g ica l p ro o f , Kant re p lie s  th a t  ex istence  i s  
not a r e a l  a t t r ib u te ,  but i s  simply the  p o s itio n  of a th in g . Other­
wise th e re  would be one a t t r ib u te  more in  the  being th a t  e x is ts  
than  in  th e  being th a t  i s  though t, which Kant says i s  im possib le, 
fo r  in  th a t  case thought would not be adequate. A hundred re a l  
crowns has no more content than  a hundred crowns in  th e  mind. We 
s h a ll  w ait fo r  H egel's answer to  th i s  con ten tion .
Kant says th a t  th e  cosmological proof i s  in s u f f ic ie n t ,  
and th a t  i t  presupposes th e  o n to lo g ica l argument. I t  would lead 
us to  in f e r  an a rc h ite c t  of th e  w orld, but not a c re a to r . I t  
would a lso  lead  us to  in fe r  a  most wise cause, and not one in f in ­
i t e ly  w ise, since our experience makes known to  us nothing absolu te 
and because our experience a lso  shows us im perfections as w ell as 
p e r fe c tio n s . Hegel answers th ese  a tta c k s  on the  proofs fo r the 
ex istence of God, so i t  w i l l  not be necessary to  dwell on them h ere .
K ant's  p ro o f, based on moral grounds, may be s ta te d  as 
fo llow s; I f  the  moral law i s  not a chimera th e  sovereign good 
must be p o ss ib le j in  o ther words, the  harmony between v ir tu e  and 
happiness must be re a liz e d . For t h i s  th e re  i s  requ ired  a w il l  
higher than  n a tu re , and higher than  man; and th i s  i s  God.
"There i s  not th e  le a s t  ground, th e re fo re , in  th e  moral 
law fo r a necessary connection between m ora lity  and pro­
p o rtio n a te  happiness in  a being th a t  belongs to  th e  world 
as p a r t of i t ,  and th e re fo re  dependent on i t ,  and which 
fo r  th a t  reason cannot by h is  w il l  be a cause of th i s  
n a tu re , nor by h is  own power make i t  thoroughly harmonize,
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as f a r  as h is  happiness i s  concerned, w ith  h is  p ra c t ic a l  p r in ­
c ip le s .  N evertheless, in  th e  p ra c t ic a l  problem of pure rea ­
son, i . e .  th e  necessary p u rsu it of th e  summum bonum, such a 
connection i s  p o stu la ted  as necessary : we ought to  endeavour
to  promote the  summum bonum, which, th e re fo re , must be poss­
ib le .  A ccordingly, the  ex istence of a cause of a l l  n a tu re , 
d is t in c t  from nature i t s e l f ,  and contain ing  th e  p r in c ip le  of 
t h i s  connection, namely of th e  exact harmony of happiness with 
m o ra lity , i s  a lso  p o s tu la te d . Now, th i s  supreme cause must 
con ta in  the p r in c ip le  of the  harmony of n a tu re , not merely w ith 
a law of th e  w i l l  of ra t io n a l  beings, but w ith the  conception 
of t h i s  law, in  so f a r  as they make i t  th e  supreme determ ining 
p r in c ip le  of the  w i l l ,  and consequently not merely w ith the 
form of m orals, but w ith th e i r  m ora lity  as th e i r  m otive, th a t  
i s  w ith th e i r  moral c h a ra c te r . T herefore , the summum bonum 
i s  po ssib le  in  th e  world only on th e  supposition  of a supreme 
Being having a c a u sa lity  corresponding to  moral c h a ra c te r ."
(C ritique of P ra c tic a l Reason, V.)
The above argument seems more l ik e  a wish than a p roo f. I t  
amounts to  saying th a t  I  have a c e r ta in  craving fo r such th in g s  as ju s ­
t i c e ,  beau ty , m o ra lity , e t c . ,  and th a t  th e re fo re  th e  cause of these  
must be a supreme Being.
H egel(1770-1831) answers K ant's  ob jec tio n  to  the  O ntological 
argument by saying th a t  God i s  to  be thought of as "thought e x is tin g " , 
and th a t  the  case of the  hundred sovereigns i s  not p a r a l l e l .  The 
p ro o f, he says in  e f f e c t ,  ap p lies  only to  the  case of a Supreme Being.
Hegal fu rth e r  i n s i s t s  th a t  reasoning from cause, o rder in  
th e  u n iv erse , e t c . ,  while e n ta il in g  some d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  cannot be lo g ic ­
a l ly  abandoned, otherw ise th e re  w ill  be an end to  th in k in g . The mind 
i s  not lim ited  by th e  f i n i t e ,  and th e re fo re  to  th in k  to  th e  u ltim ate  i s  
not fo o lis h , but necessary .
"That upward spring of the  mind s ig n if ie s  th a t  the  being 
which th e  world has i s  only a  semblance, no r e a l  be ing , no 
abso lu te  t r u th ;  i t  s ig n if ie s  th a t  beyond and above th a t  
apparent being , t r u th  abides in  God, so th a t  tru e  being i s  
another name fo r God." (Logic, W allace 's  T rans, p p .87 ,88).
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Some Contemporary Thoughts on the  
Existence of God
I  s h a ll  se le c t as ty p ic a l  of contemporary d iscu ss io n  of God's
ex istence th re e  a r t i c l e s :  one from th e  "Journal of P h ilosophical
S tu d ie s" , and two from th e  "H ibbert Jo u rn a l" .
P rofessor G.C. F ie ld , in  th e  Journal of P h ilosoph ical S tudies 
fo r Ju ly , 1928, w rite s  an a r t i c l e  e n t i t le d :  "Some Modern Proofs fo r
the  Existence of God". A fte r remarking th a t  the  O ntological p ro o f, 
and the  argument of the  F ir s t  Mover carry  very l i t t l e  conviction  to  mod­
ern  though t, and th a t  the  old form of the  argument from design seems not 
to  have an adequate b as is  in  f a c t ,  th e  p ro fesso r s e le c ts  two types of 
argument on which to  base h is  d iscu ss io n : (1) th e  demand fo r  a te le o lo g -
ic a l  ex p lan atio n , and (2) th e  argument from re lig io u s  experience.
I t  i s  n a tu ra l th a t  P rofessor F ie ld 's  d iscu ssio n  of the  te le o -  
lo g ic a l argument should commence w ith  a re ference  to  modern sc ience ; and 
to  begin w ith  he makes a very im portant observation  on s c ie n t i f ic  method:
"Research in  th e  h is to ry  and methodology of the  exact sciences 
rev ea ls  th e  fac t th a t  th ese  sciences have come in to  being and 
developed not m erely, as some s c ie n t i s t s  seem in c lin e d  to  a s s e r t ,  
by th e  observation  and recording  of ex te rn a l sen sib le  f a c ts ,  but 
by th e  adoption p r io r  to  t h i s  of what can only be described  as 
a  p a r t ic u la r  p h ilo soph ica l theory  of th e  natu re  of r e a l i ty ."
(Journal P h il. S tu d ies , July 1928, page 325).
He then  s ta te s  th a t  th e  assumption underlying a l l  s c ie n t i f ic  
research  was th a t  "the f in a l  exp lanation  of what happened was to  be 
found in  those  elements which were ex p ress ib le  in  term s of m athem atics." 
Anyone fa m ilia r  w ith modern research  must re a liz e  th a t  th e  g en era l tend­
ency i s  to  reduce th in g s  to  m athem atics, or to  exp la in  them in  terms of 
m athem atics. We have th e  modern attem pt in  educational work to  ra te  
n a tive  in te llig e n c e  by numbers. The assumption expressed in  general
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te rn s  i s  s ta te d  by P rofessor F ie ld  as follows* "The u ltim ate  r e a l i ty  
must be one and th e  same behind a l l  th e  apparent v a r ia tio n s  of i t . ”
Thus i t  i s  shown by th e  author th a t  th e re  i s  a connection between the  
sc ien ce .o f th e  present day and ph ilo so p h ica l reasoning as to  the  nature 
of th in g s , in  th a t  pure reasoning precedes th e  experim ental work. In 
f a c t ,  experim ental work i s  undertaken by th e  s c ie n t i s t  fo r  th e  purpose 
of v e rify in g  what has a lready  been reasoned as tru e  through the  medium 
of philosophy. The development of th e  atomic theory  i s  a  case in  
p o in t, as i t  found what r e a l i ty  must be l ik e  in  order to  s a t i s fy  the 
demands of th e  reason fo r  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ,  and th i s  has been g radually  
brought to  a  c e r ta in  stage of v e r i f ic a t io n .
But the  assumptions used as the  b a s is  of science do not give 
us a  s u f f ic ie n t ly  firm  b a s is  fo r  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ;  our reason demands 
more than  t h i s .  According to  th e  te le o lo g ic a l  argument, th e  ex istence 
of a Supreme Being f in a l ly  s a t i s f i e s  th e  demand of our reason fo r  i n t e l l ­
i g i b i l i t y ,  because then  th e re  would be a Supreme In te llig e n c e  capable of 
i n s t i l l i n g  purpose in  th in g s , and towards Whom, th e re fo re  a l l  th in g s  
would ten d .
When th e  w r i te r ,  P rofessor F ie ld , comes to  evaluate  t h i s  argu­
ment, he regards i t  as v a lid  on two p o in ts ,  v iz .  i t s  theory  of th e  
grounds of s c ie n t i f ic  knowledge, and th e  p lace of th e  demand fo r  i n t e l l ­
i g i b i l i t y  in  th e  development of t h i s  knowledge. In  s p ite  of t h i s ,  how­
ever, he argues th a t  we cannot reduce the  proof fo r  th e  ex istence of God 
to  anything th a t  can be v e r if ie d  by sen sib le  experience:
” . . .  a doctrine  which cannot be v e r if ie d  in  sen sib le  exper­
ience may, i t  i s  t r u e ,  be pronounced p o ss ib le , but cannot ever 
be regarded as c e r ta in ly  e s ta b lish e d ."  (Op. C it .  329)
P rofessor F ie ld ’s doubt of th e  f in a l i ty  of th e  te le o lo g ic a l
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argument, as fa r  as s a tis fy in g  reason i s  concerned, i s  expressed in  the  
follow ing words:
"Does the  s c ie n t i f ic  exp lanation  leave us asking fo r  more, 
while the  te le o lo g ic a l  exp lanation  f in a l ly  s a t i s f i e s  us? I  
cannot believe  th a t  th i s  i s  so* I  do not know how I  can d is ­
prove i t  in  a way which could convince those  who fe e l  firm ly 
s a t i s f ie d  th a t  i t  i s  so . But I  th ink  such evidence as we 
can ge t both from th e  general fe e lin g s  of mankind and the  
more c a re fu l an a ly s is  of th e  id ea  of purpose i s  on my s id e ."
( Op. C it .  329).
The author brings h is  argument a  stage fu r th e r  by s ta t in g :
"How fa r  does the  mind or purpose which could be invoked as 
the  explanation  of th ese  phenomena correspond w ith  th e  id ea  of 
God th a t  th e  re lig io u s  consciousness seems to  demand? To take 
the  f i r s t  po in t th a t  might suggest a doubt. I  have already 
in d ica ted  th a t  fo r purpose to  be accepted as a s a tis fa c to ry
exp lanation  of anything we ought a t le a s t  to  give some sugges­
t io n  of what the purpose i s .  And i f  we ask what kind of pur­
pose i s  suggested by b io lo g ic a l phenomena, th e  one most obvi­
ous fe a tu re  of i t  i s  th a t  i t  appears to  aim p rim arily  a t the  
production of more and more l i f e  as long as t h i s  was capable 
of su rv iv a l in  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  environment." ( Op. C i t .  331).
The au thor admits the  ex istence  of purpose. He s ta te s  th a t  
obviously i t  i s  th e  production of more and more l i f e .  I t  should be re ­
marked a t t h i s  poin t th a t  th e re  i s  no approach to  f in a l  purpose h ere ,
but merely a  s e tt in g  out again on a long chain of ev en ts , l ik e  the
t r a v e l l e r ,  who, having reached one town on h is  journey, fin d s  ye t ahead 
of him o th er towns th a t  he may v i s i t .  And as to  su rv iv a l in  th e  env ir­
onment, i t  i s  only a su rv iv a l in  tim e fo r  any b io lo g ic a l being , which 
fa c t must bring, to  on e 's  a t te n t io n  th e  ex istence of a purpose d i f f e r ­
ent e n tire ly  to  th a t  of su rv iv a l. What i s  th e  purpose of non-surv ival?
P rofessor F ie ld  goes on to  say th a t  th e  God of Biology would 
not be an omnipotent God, although He would be "immensely more powerful 
than  anything th a t  we can conceive from our own experience."  But i f  
purpose i s  adm itted , then  b io lo g ic a l th in g s  would have a tendency towards 
a f in i t e  being , which could not s a t is fy  th e  mind of man in  i t s  mighty up­
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ward urge . Even supposing a f in i t e  being as the  God of Biology* i t  
would s t i l l  be necessary to  p o s tu la te  an Omnipotent God* I n f in i te  in  a l l
th in g s ,  p e rfe c tio n s , and a t t r ib u te s ,  as the  only s a tis fy in g  Object of 
th e  human mind. The human mind could never be s a t i s f ie d  w ith  th a t  
which i t  can compass; and the  human mind can compass th a t  which i s  
f i n i t e .  I f  a f in i t e  being were th e  God of B iology, i t  i s  c e r ta in  th a t  
in  th e  course of tim e man would know as much as the  f in i t e  be ing , th a t  
d ise a se , dea th , and a l l  e v ils  would be overcome; th a t  man would make 
over th e  world in  such a way th a t  he would have a l l  th e  d e lig h ts  of the  
b es t food, d rin k , and c lim ate ; and th a t  in  the  end th e  world would be­
come so th ic k ly  populated th a t  o ther planets- would have to  be sought 
o u t. There i s  no sign th a t  th ese  th in g s  w i l l  come abou t, even though
man w i l l  c e r ta in ly  gain  in  knowledge; but he fo rg e ts  a  g re a t deal of
what he le a rn s ,  and th e re  i s  no doubt but th a t  he w il l  continue to  do 
so . Therefore i t  i s  hard ly  l ik e ly  th a t  man would know a l l  th in g s .
P ro fessor F ie ld  says: " . . .  in  our ord inary  and fa m ilia r  use
of purpose as an explanation  we never do regard i t  as by i t s e l f
a complete and s u f f ic ie n t  exp lanation  of an y th in g ." (B p .C it.332).
I  do not th ink  th e re  would be much of a q u arre l w ith  P rofessor 
F ie ld  on th a t  sta tem ent, as the  mind i s  not s a t i s f ie d  u n t i l  i t  has exam­
ined a l l  evidence, not merely p a rt of i t .  When l a t e r  th e  author says: 
"The conclusion I  would draw i s  th a t  th e  appeal to  purpose as a s a t i s fy ­
ing p r in c ip le  of explanation  has c e r ta in ly  considerable fo rc e " , he g e ts  
to  the  h e a rt of the  m a tte r: fo r  conviction  depends upon what se t the
mind ta k e s , and th e  se t the  mind tak es  depends again  on what th e  w il l  
chooses. A man might c lose h is  mind to  acceptance of a t r u th  through 
re fu sa l of th e  w il l  to  accept the evidence p resen ted . Against such a 
mind even v a lid  proofs are  u se le ss  in  c e r ta in  cases.
While th e  author does not g ran t f in a l i ty  to  th e  te le o lo g ic a l
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p ro o f» he concludes as follows*
MI f  we are l e f t  w ith any th ing , i t  i s  only w ith th e  no tion  of 
a  whole o r abso lu te  as th e  only f in a l  ground of everything w ith­
in  i t .  This i s  a no tion  of which i t  behoves us to  speak w ith 
a l l  re sp e c t. But i t  i s  em phatically  not anything l ik e  an ex­
p lan a tio n  by purpose. And, indeed, i t  has been abundantly 
shown th a t  such a view must n e ce ssa rily  regard  purpose, o r any­
th in g  e lse  th a t  involves consciousness and in d iv id u a l personal­
i t y ,  as p a r t i a l ,  and th e re fo re  not u ltim a te ly  r e a l ."
I  s h a ll  conclude d iscu ssio n  of th e  te le o lo g ic a l  argument by 
observing th a t  S t. Thomas Aquinas, in  h is  quinque v iae d e a lt w ith  be­
fo re  in  t h i s  paper, was not content to  r e s t  h is  case on one proof only ,
but upon f iv e ,  so th a t  th e  whole of r e a l i ty  might be considered . Even
th en , he was not co n ten t, fo r  the  deductions drawn from th e  quinque 
v iae  as to  th e  a t t r ib u te s  of th e  God he reached through h is  proofs add 
g re a te r  and g re a te r  evidence to  th a t  a lready  presented  in  th e  fiv e  
p ro o fs . I t  i s  only f a i r  to  g ran t P rofessor F ie ld  th e  p r iv ile g e  of 
d iscussing  any one of th e  g rea t arguments, but to  express th e  hope th a t  
he too would see th e  n ecess ity  of examining a l l  th e  arguments.
A s ig n if ic a n t statem ent in  th e  second p a rt of P ro fesso r F ie ld ’ s 
a r t i c l e  g ives an id ea  of a  modern tre n d  in  considering  th e  ex istence of 
God*
"And y e t in  much of th e  b est modern thought on th e  sub jec t 
th i s  appeal to  th e  re lig io u s  experience seems to  be tak in g  the  
most im portant p lac e , and to  be in c reasin g ly  put forward as 
th e  ch ie f or sometimes th e  only ra t io n a l  ground fo r  a b e l ie f  
in  God. We are  no longer to ld  th a t  God e x is t s ,  and th e re fo re  
we must worship Him. The argument i s  ra th e r  th a t  we worship 
God, and th e re fo re  He e x is ts ."
This argument i s  very much l ik e  K ant's  so -ca lled  moral p roo f.
I t  amounts to  saying th a t  we have a fe e lin g  th a t  God ought to  e x is t ,  
and then  concluding th a t  He does. I t  asks us to  p lace too g rea t a 
t r u s t  in  our emotional experiences. Of course, when i t  i s  observed 
t h a t ,  as D escartes contended, th a t  a l l  men have th e  id ea  of God, th e  
evidence fo r God's ex istence i s  c e r ta in ly  weighty; and i f  th e  un iver-
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s a l  d e s ire  of man to  worship something be considered , th e  ex isten ce  of 
God as an exp lanation  of th i s  d e s ire  c e r ta in ly  c a r r ie s  considerable 
fo rc e , even i f  th e  u n iv ersa l d es ire  of worship i s  not regarded as an
ap o d ic tic  proof of God’ s ex is ten ce .
I  tu rn  now to  a co n sid e ra tio n  of whether a Personal God ex­
i s t s .  As I  sa id  before in  t h i s  paper, A r is to t le  did not consider the  
question  a t a l l  when he a rriv e d  a t th e  no tion  of th e  A bsolute. The 
problem i s  e s s e n tia l ly  a modern one.
P ro fessor C.D. Broad, w ritin g  in  th e  H ibbert Journal a tta c k s  
th e  problem by defin ing  what i s  meant by a person, and then what i s  
meant by a  God. The notes of p e rso n a lity  he g ives as follows* (1) I t  
must th in k , f e e l ,  w i l l ,  e tc .  (2) I t s  various m ental s ta te s  must have
f u l le s t  u n ity . (3) I t s  successive t o t a l  m ental s ta te s  must have f u l le s t
u n ity . (4) These two kinds of u n ity  must be recognized by i t s e l f ,  i . e .  
i t  must know immediately th a t  i t  i s  a mind. He then notes th re e  ideas 
of God* the  popular id e a , th e  th e o lo g ic a l ,  and th e  p h ilo so p h ic a l. In 
th e  popular sense, God i s  regarded as a person. In  th e  th eo lo g ic a l 
sense he s ta te s  th a t  God need not be a person , and notes th a t  th e  Athan- 
as ian  Creed says th a t  th e  F ather i s  God, th e  Son i s  God, and th e  Holy 
Ghost i s  God, but th a t  th e re  are  not th re e  Gods- only one God. I t  does 
not speak of the T r in ity  as being a person , but i t  does speak of th re e  
d iv ine persons as forming th e  T r in i ty .  In  o ther re sp e c ts , th e  th eo lo g ic ­
a l  id ea  of God i s  narrower than  th e  popular id e a . God must be om nipotent, 
in f in i t e ly  p e r fe c t ,  and unique. The p h ilo soph ica l sense in  which God i s  
considered i s  even wider than  th e  popular concep tion ,o r th e  th e o lo g ic a l.
The p ro fesso r d ism isses th e  O ntological argument and a lso  th e  
Cosmological by saying th a t  n e ith e r  proves th e  ex istence  of a  personal 
God, even i f  we admit th a t  they  do prove th e  ex istence of God. Against
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
th e  inductive  argument fro® design , he b rings th e  follow ing c ritic ism *
"Even i f  we accept the  argument i t  w i l l  not prove th e  ex istence 
of God in  th e  th e o lo g ic a l sense . In  the  f i r s t  p lace , i t  would 
prove only th a t  a designing mind had ex is ted  in  th e  p a s t ,  not th a t  
i t  does ex is t now." (Hibbert Jo u rn a l, Vol. XXIV, page 46).
There are two weaknesses in  t h i s  sta tem en t. There i s  not su f­
f ic ie n t  reason to  say th a t  th in g s  now e x is t  by them selves; i f  c rea tio n  
be adm itted , and i f  we accept th e  argument from design we admit c re a tio n , 
i t  follow s th a t  th e  same c re a tiv e  power now must of n ecess ity  conserve
the  th in g s  th a t  are in  ex is ten c e . Secondly, th e re  can be no past w ith
God Who i s  adm itted a f t e r  th e  argument from design . Time has nothing 
to  do w ith the  case , because God must be tim e le ss .
In  answer to  th e  argument fo r  th e  ex istence of God a rriv e d  a t 
because of th e  ex istence of minds l ik e  o u rs , p ro fesso r Broad says th a t  
the hypothesis of a God would not exp la in  th e  ex istence of minds, because*
"(1) We are s t i l l  obliged to  suppose th a t  th e re  have always 
been minds, though not always non-divine minds. And th e  pro­
duction  of non-divine minds from mere m atter remains ju s t  as 
u n in te l l ig ib le  whether we say th a t  i t  happens spontaneously or 
th a t  i t  i s  m iraculously accomplished by G od."(O p.Cit. 46 ).
I t  need not be adm itted th a t  minds a re  produced from m atter 
through the  in te rv e n tio n  of God. On th e  p o s tu la te  of God th e re  i s  no­
th in g  to  stand in  th e  way of c re a tio n  of th ese  minds. And in  any case , 
i f  God i s  p o s tu la te d , I  have a r e a l  explanation  of minds th a t  are  f i n i t e .
An answer to  P rofessor B road 's arguments appears in  th e  same 
volume of th e  H ibbert Jo u rnal. I  quoted from th i s  a r t i c le  in  the  in t r o ­
duction to  th i s  th e s is .  I  s h a ll  quote again to  show an exp lanation  of 
reasonableness fo r  a b e l ie f  in  God, even i f  i t  i s .n o t ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, 
a proof*
"But, on the o ther hand, i f  th e  search fo r  an ir re f ra g a b le  
proof has been, in  some measure, the  chase of a w il l  of the  
w isp , which appears but to  d isappear; has been something in
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th e  natu re  of th e  search fo r  th e  p h ilo so p h er 's  s tbne; the  
same cannot be sa id  of the  search fo r  th e  o b jec t of th a t  
p ro o f, of the  search fo r God Himself* In a l l  s in c e r i ty  I  
ask whether those who have sought fo r  Him, not merely by 
argum entation, but by moral and s p ir i tu a l  e f f o r t ,  have fa i le d  
to  f in d  Him. Have those who sought fo r l i f e ' s  u ltim ate  
v a lu es , fo r  the  h ighest s a t is f a c t io n  of i n t e l l e c t ;  the  
most p e rfe c t content of h e a r t ;  the utmost r e s t  of consci­
ence, fa ile d  to  apprehend, in  some fash ion , the  Being of 
Whom they were in  se a rc h ." (H ibbert Jo u rn a l, Vol.XXIV, 400).
I t  should be added h e re , in  considering  whether a personal 
God e x is ts ,  th a t  our ideas of p e rso n a lity  would not be f i t t i n g  in  re ­
la t io n  to  God. I f  God i s  a Person, He i s  not th e  same kind of per­
son th a t  we a re . I t  i s  tru e  we may define the notes of p e rso n a lity , 
but when i t  comes to  the case of applying these  notes to  the  A bsolute, 
we may f a i l  u t t e r ly .
<
This th e s is  would not be complete w ithout mentioning again 
th e  idea of considering the  arguments as a whole when try in g  to  prove 
th e  ex istence of God. The follow ing quotation  w il l  p resen t the  case 
in  a very en ligh ten ing  ways
"We glance around and find  th a t  th i s  id e n ti ty  of m u lt ip l i­
c i ty  i s  everywhere tru e  of God and i s  a touchstone of sound 
theod icy . For th e  human mind s tru g g lin g  to  see God from such 
g rea t d is ta n c e s , lea rn s  th a t  the p i t i f u l  scraps of knowledge 
th a t  we acquire about Him are rendered most valuable when they 
are  made to  support one ano ther, when they a re  made to  converge 
upon th e i r  d iv ine o b je c t. I t  seems as i f  God's s im p lic ity  i s  
such th a t  i t  i s  n ecessa rily  re f le c te d  in  th e  detached b i t s  of 
knowledge we have of Him. Answer te n  questions about God, and 
th en  compare th e  answ ers. I f  they a re  t r u e ,  they enjoy not 
merely the coherence th a t  t ru th s  always po ssess, but a  un ity  
th a t  looks su rp ris in g ly  lik e  id e n t i ty .  Let the  answers be 
f a l s e ,  and they w il l  p re se n t, when viewed to g e th e r , no mere o r­
d inary  in co n sis ten cy , but in s tead  th e  u t te r  inconsistency  of 
chaos. . . .  The human in te l l e c t  i s  not bankrupt. I t  knows a 
l i t t l e  about God- a l i t t l e ,b y  the  way, th a t  i s  tremendously v a l­
uab le- but i t  has not shown i t s e l f  completely adequate to  the 
ta s k .  I t  never w i l l ,  as long as the ob ject i s  in f in i t e  and the  
mind i s  f i n i t e .  Our th eo d ic ie s  th en , are n ecessa rily  imper­
f e c t .  I f  we would measure th e i r  w orth, we have a p ra c t ic a l  
and f a i r ly  r e l ia b le  c r i te r io n  in  th e i r  coherence and incoherence." 
(C o llin s- Proceedings S ix th  Annual M eeting, Am.Cath. P h ilo s .
A sso c ia tio n , 67, 68).
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